Sebens (2025) has proposed a semiclassical “precursor” to quantum electrodynamics (QED) in which the electron’s anomalous magnetic moment arises from the self-interaction of an extended charge distribution governed by the Dirac equation. The calculation reproduces Schwinger’s leading-order value only for suitably tuned, spatially extended wave-packets, and thus yields a state-dependent magnetic moment. This paper offers a systematic critique of that result. After reviewing the standard QED derivation—where the anomaly is fixed by gauge symmetry, the Ward–Takahashi identity, and renormalization—we show that the semiclassical model lacks the structural resources that guarantee universality. Drawing on a general distinction between phenomenological dependence and theoretical fundamentality, we argue that Sebens’s construction attains intuitive, mechanical appeal at the cost of explanatory depth: its high phenomenologicality cannot compensate for its low fundamentality. What Sebens treats as a puzzle for QED—how the theory “nails down” a single value of 

The problem of recovering information from the interior of a black hole is crucial to any resolution of the information loss paradox. In this article, we critically evaluate the program of holographic interior reconstruction within the AdS/CFT correspondence, explaining the conceptual underpinnings and implicit assumptions behind the recovery of black hole interior information, in the face of the apparent impossibility of doing so due to the AMPSS paradox. We also show how the implicit assumptions behind holographic interior reconstruction are the same as those underpinning an apparently unrelated popular resolution of the firewall paradox. By doing so, we highlight how holographic interior reconstruction fits within a larger conceptual strategy for attacking the problem of describing black holes in Quantum Gravity.

We consider the observables describing spatiotemporal properties in the context of two of the most popular approaches to quantum gravity (QG), namely String Theory and Loop QG. In both approaches these observables are described by non-commuting operators. In analogy with recent arguments put forward in the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics [see Calosi and Mariani (Philos. Compass 16(4):e12731, 2021) for a review], we suggest that the physical quantities corresponding to those observables may be interpreted as ontologically indeterminate—i.e., indeterminate in a way that is non-epistemic and semantic-independent. This working hypothesis has not received enough attention in the current debate on QG, and yet it may prove explanatory useful in several respects. First, it provides a clear background for understanding how some features of QG are ontologically continuous to features of quantum mechanics. Second, it sets the stage for asking new interesting questions about QG, for instance concerning the status of the so-called Eigenstate-Eigenvalue link. Third, it indirectly shows how the debate on ontological indeterminacy may extend well beyond the non-relativistic case, contrary to what seems to be assumed. Fourth, and perhaps more importantly, it provides a promising alternative to the received view on QG [Wüthrich et al. (Philosophy Beyond Spacetime: Implications from Quantum Gravity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021)] according to which spacetime is not fundamental. On the view we shall suggest, spacetime may be indeterminate and yet fundamental.

Canonically, ‘classic’ tests of general relativity (GR) include perihelion precession, the bending of light around stars, and gravitational redshift; ‘modern’ tests have to do with, inter alia, relativistic time delay, equivalence principle tests, gravitational lensing, strong field gravity, and gravitational waves. The orthodoxy is that both classic and modern tests of GR afford experimental confirmation of that theory in particular. In this article, we question this orthodoxy, by showing there are classes of both relativistic theories (with spatiotemporal geometrical properties different from those of GR) and non-relativistic theories (in which the lightcones of a relativistic spacetime are ‘widened’) which would also pass such tests. Thus, (a) issues of underdetermination in the context of GR loom much larger than one might have thought, and (b) given this, one has to think more carefully about what exactly such tests in fact are testing.

This paper examines the tension between wave function realism and interpretations of gauge symmetries within quantum mechanics. We explore how traditional views of gauge symmetries as descriptive redundancies challenge the principles of wave function realism, which regards the wave function as a real entity. By noting that, through the case study of a quantum particle in an electromagnetic field, gauge transformations impact the wave function’s phase, we present a dilemma for wave function realism. We discuss potential resolutions, including redefining ontological commitments to accommodate gauge-invariance.

Supersymmetry is a conjectured symmetry that relates standard model's bosons and fermions. The spin-statistics theorem, which states that a particle's statistics depends on its spin, is a crucial component of quantum field theory's analysis of matter. Prima facie, supersymmetry creates problems for the theoretical structure underpinned by the spin-statistics theorem. Since supersymmetry relates bosons and fermions, the distinction between particles obeying Bose-Einstein or Fermi-Dirac statistics seems to collapse since, ultimately, they are part of a single supermultiplet, that is, the actual degree of freedom of supersymmetric quantum field theory. This article aims to evaluate the status of the spin- statistics theorem within supersymmetric quantum field theories and which strategies one can implement to make sense of this state of affairs. In particular, we argue that there are two main options in the face of the conflict between Wigner's theorem and the spin-statistics theorem: either we abandon the validity of the spin-statistics theorem and adopt an invariant superfield ontology, or we abandon Wigner's theorem and uphold spin-statistics theorem, at the price, however, of introducing a significant redundancy in our ontological. Moreover, we explore how these two options relate to important philosophical debates, such as the nature of superspace and spacetime ontologies, and the debates between motivationalists and interpretationalist regarding physical symmetry.rovide a new framework for understanding the nature of black hole horizons in full Quantum Gravity.