What Is Indeterminate?
Heisenberg and three readings of the uncertainty relations. Notes from my talk at the Nuovo SEFIR round table, fifty years after Heisenberg's death.
Werner Heisenberg died fifty years ago, and on 30 October I spoke about him at a round table organised by Nuovo SEFIR. There are many things one can say about Heisenberg: matrix mechanics at twenty-three, the uncertainty paper at twenty-five, the early quantum field theory with Pauli, the proton-neutron model of the nucleus, the Nobel Prize for 1932. I chose to say one thing, and to try to say it well. The text of the talk and the slides, in Italian, are linked at the end.
The one thing is a question. We all learned that, according to Heisenberg, position and momentum cannot be known together. Put that way, the claim concerns the limits of our knowledge. Read the texts, however, and three different claims appear, and the difference between them is a philosophical problem in its own right. When we say that position and momentum are not determined together, what exactly is missing? It may be our knowledge; it may be the possibility of saying anything about reality beyond what we measure; or it may be definite values in reality itself.
1925: giving up the orbit
The question has its roots in the paper Heisenberg wrote on Helgoland in June 1925. Bohr’s atom described electrons moving on orbits that nobody had ever observed; what one observes of an atom is the light it emits. Heisenberg decided to keep only that. The three-line abstract announces the whole programme, a quantum mechanics founded
exclusively on relations between quantities that are observable in principle.1
The second page draws the consequence:
In this situation it seems more advisable to give up altogether the hope of observing the quantities that have so far been unobservable (such as the position and period of revolution of the electron) […] and to try to construct a quantum-theoretical mechanics, analogous to classical mechanics, in which only relations between observable quantities occur.2
Carlo Rovelli, in Helgoland, describes the move well: Heisenberg keeps the known forces and the known equations, and changes the way of thinking about the electron.3 In place of a position that varies in time he writes tables of numbers, one for each transition between states. When two such tables are multiplied, the order matters: x times y can differ from y times x. Heisenberg noted this as a difficulty in half a line;4 within weeks Born recognised matrices, and the difficulty became the core of the theory. The first contribution is already conceptual. Heisenberg decided which quantities have physical meaning and let the mathematics draw the consequences.
1927: the microscope
Two years later Heisenberg asked what his formalism means in a simple experiment. The answer is the famous gamma-ray microscope. To locate an electron precisely one needs light of very short wavelength, and such light gives the electron a sudden kick:
At the instant when the position is determined, that is, at the instant when the light quantum is deflected by the electron, the electron changes its momentum discontinuously. This change is the greater, the smaller the wavelength of the light used, that is, the more precise the determination of the position.5
The more precise the position, the larger the change of momentum. This is the story everyone knows.
Two remarks complicate it. The rigorous inequality proved by Kennard a few months later says nothing about kicks: it constrains the statistical spread of position and momentum in ensembles prepared in the same way.6 And in his 1929 Chicago lectures Heisenberg himself observed that, after the collision, both the position and the momentum the electron had can be reconstructed, so that “the uncertainty relation does not hold for the past”.7 What it forbids is prediction. From the beginning, the formula and the story do not coincide.
Three readings
The 1927 paper contains three answers to the question, which I call epistemic, agnostic and realist.
The epistemic reading concerns what we can know. The electron has a position and a momentum, and measuring one disturbs the other. This is the reading suggested by the microscope, it is the one that survives in common sense, and it is still the reading of the Bohmians, for whom every particle always has a definite position. Bohr objected at once, and persuaded Heisenberg to add a note in proof:8 in that experiment position and momentum cannot be defined together, and the epistemic reading presupposes precisely a hidden value that the theory, as he and Heisenberg formulated it, does not supply.
The agnostic reading concerns what can be said. Its starting point is semantic: an expression such as “the position of the electron” has meaning only if one specifies an experiment that measures it. Applied to the orbit of the electron in the hydrogen atom, the conclusion is this:
Of such light, however, a single light quantum is enough to throw the electron completely out of its “orbit” […]; the word “orbit” therefore has no reasonable sense here.9
On this reading, nothing is affirmed and nothing is denied about the electron beyond measurement. The question is suspended. Its cost is the identification of meaning with measurability, a thesis with many supporters in 1927 and few today.
The realist reading concerns what there is. In the same paper Heisenberg writes:
The “path” comes into being only through our observing it.10
The indeterminacy is placed in nature. The realism here is realism about indeterminacy: before measurement, what is real is a property without a definite value. The epistemic reading is realist too, in its own way, since it takes the hidden values to exist. The difference lies in where the indeterminacy is located.
The three readings are not successive stages. They sit a few pages apart in the same paper, and Heisenberg moves between them without comment, because he took measuring a quantity to give it both meaning and reality. Rovelli reports Pauli’s verdict on his friend: all intuition, little care for stating assumptions clearly. The paper nonetheless ends with a firm choice:
In the sharp formulation of the causal law, “if we know the present exactly, we can calculate the future”, it is not the conclusion but the premise that is false.11
Heisenberg then calls the idea of a hidden causal world behind the statistical one fruitless and meaningless.
Potentia
The realist reading receives its fullest form thirty years later, in the Gifford Lectures published as Physics and Philosophy. The probability wave, Heisenberg writes, means “a tendency for something”, a quantitative version of the Aristotelian potentia:
It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.12
An indeterminate property is neither missing nor unknown. It is a property in potency, a real tendency of the electron to be found here rather than there, actualised in measurement. In today’s vocabulary one would speak of dispositions or propensities.
The seed is already in 1927, where every perception is described as a selection from a plenitude of possibilities and a limitation of what will be possible in the future.13 Even in 1958, however, Heisenberg does not decide completely: the probability function also contains our incomplete knowledge, and its sudden change at measurement is a change in what we know. The realist and the epistemic readings coexist until the end.
Who observes?
None of this makes consciousness the creator of reality, and Heisenberg says so explicitly:
The transition from the “possible” to the “actual” takes place as soon as the interaction of the object with the measuring device, and thereby with the rest of the world, has come into play; it is not connected with the act of registration of the result by the mind of the observer.14
His 1935 manuscript replying to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen states it sharply: the blackening of a photographic plate is an objective fact, whoever looks at it and whenever. The same manuscript shows that the cut between the quantum system and the classical apparatus can be moved toward the observer without changing the predictions, which are “independent of the location of the cut”, while the cut itself cannot be removed.15 Heisenberg’s observer is the classical side of that cut.
What remains open
The uncertainty relations are usually presented as a limit on what we can know. In Heisenberg’s texts they are a question about what is indeterminate, answered three times, in three ways that he never fully separated. The debate is still alive: physicists argue about rigorous error-disturbance relations alongside Kennard’s inequality, and philosophers about metaphysical indeterminacy and unsharp properties. The question Heisenberg left is what is real between one observation and the next. His answer was that possibilities and tendencies belong to nature as much as facts do.
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Cover: Werner Heisenberg in 1933. Photo: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-R57262, CC-BY-SA 3.0. Translations from the German are mine.
References
Heisenberg, W. (1925). “Über quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer Beziehungen”. Zeitschrift für Physik 33: 879–893.
Heisenberg, W. (1927). “Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik”. Zeitschrift für Physik 43: 172–198.
Heisenberg, W. (1930). The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Heisenberg, W. (1935). “Ist eine deterministische Ergänzung der Quantenmechanik möglich?”. In W. Pauli, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, vol. II. Berlin: Springer, 1985. English translation by E. Crull and G. Bacciagaluppi.
Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. New York: Harper & Brothers.
Hilgevoord, J., and Uffink, J. “The Uncertainty Principle”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kennard, E. H. (1927). “Zur Quantenmechanik einfacher Bewegungstypen”. Zeitschrift für Physik 44: 326–352.
Rovelli, C. (2020). Helgoland. Milan: Adelphi.
Footnotes
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Heisenberg (1925), p. 879: “ausschließlich auf Beziehungen zwischen prinzipiell beobachtbaren Größen”. ↩
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Heisenberg (1925), p. 880: “Bei dieser Sachlage scheint es geratener, jene Hoffnung auf eine Beobachtung der bisher unbeobachtbaren Größen (wie Lage, Umlaufszeit des Elektrons) ganz aufzugeben […] und zu versuchen, eine der klassischen Mechanik analoge quantentheoretische Mechanik auszubilden, in welcher nur Beziehungen zwischen beobachtbaren Größen vorkommen.” ↩
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Rovelli (2020), part I, ch. 1. ↩
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Heisenberg (1925), p. 884. ↩
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Heisenberg (1927), pp. 174–175: “Im Augenblick der Ortsbestimmung, also dem Augenblick, in dem das Lichtquant vom Elektron abgebeugt wird, verändert das Elektron seinen Impuls unstetig. Diese Änderung ist um so größer, je kleiner die Wellenlänge des benutzten Lichtes, d. h. je genauer die Ortsbestimmung ist.” ↩
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Kennard (1927). On the difference between Kennard’s inequality and the disturbance story, see Hilgevoord and Uffink. ↩
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Heisenberg (1930), p. 15. ↩
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Heisenberg (1927), pp. 197–198. ↩
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Heisenberg (1927), §1: “Von solchem Licht aber genügt ein einziges Lichtquant, um das Elektron völlig aus seiner ‚Bahn’ zu werfen […], das Wort ‚Bahn’ hat hier also keinen vernünftigen Sinn.” ↩
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Heisenberg (1927), p. 185: “Die ‚Bahn’ entsteht erst dadurch, daß wir sie beobachten.” ↩
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Heisenberg (1927), p. 197: “Aber an der scharfen Formulierung des Kausalgesetzes: ‚Wenn wir die Gegenwart genau kennen, können wir die Zukunft berechnen’, ist nicht der Nachsatz, sondern die Voraussetzung falsch.” ↩
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Heisenberg (1958), ch. II. ↩
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Heisenberg (1927), p. 197. ↩
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Heisenberg (1958), ch. III. ↩
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Heisenberg (1935), §§1–2, in the translation by Crull and Bacciagaluppi. ↩