What Can Be Measured?
Galileo chose to measure the affections of things rather than their essence, and physics was born. The same choice can serve the study of religion and development, but only on one condition.
At the Bridging Worlds conference in Castel Gandolfo, one of the two lines of work was the attempt to map and measure what faith-based actors contribute to development. In the previous note I looked at the logic of the statements this research makes. Here I want to ask a prior question, which the natural sciences faced long ago: what exactly can be measured when the object is something like communion, trust or the common good, and what can the history of physics teach us about it?
Galileo’s choice
In 1612, in the third of his letters on sunspots, Galileo distinguished two ways of studying nature. Either we try, by speculation, “to penetrate the true and intrinsic essence of natural substances”, or we content ourselves “with coming to know some of their affections”.1 He judged the first task hopeless for the time being and chose the second, i.e. the study of place, motion, shape and size, which are properties that can be observed and measured. Physics has followed this choice ever since. Indeed, we do not know what gravity is in itself, but we measure its effects with great precision.
The same distinction applies to the study of what faith-based actors contribute to development. Communion, faith and flourishing cannot be measured as such, but their affections can, i.e. the practices they generate and the effects they leave in the life of a community. Measuring affections rather than essences is the same choice that made physics possible. That the most important things cannot be measured directly holds for mass and temperature as well, and it has not prevented physics from measuring them.
Where the analogy breaks
The analogy, however, breaks at two points. The first concerns the relation between what is measured and what it is supposed to indicate. When a column of mercury rises, a well-tested theory explains why its height carries information about temperature. Between the observable effects of a faith-based initiative and the relational good that is supposed to produce them, there is no comparable theory. Indeed, the same effects (cooperation, sharing, social impact) can come from communion, but also from strategy, convenience or good marketing. Thus, while in physics the affections are connected to the underlying quantity by a law, here the connection has to be argued for case by case.
The second point concerns the effect of measurement on what is measured. In physics, too, measuring means interacting: as I recalled in a note on Heisenberg, in quantum theory a measurement is a physical interaction with an apparatus, and its outcome depends on that interaction. The electron, however, has no interest in the outcome, whereas communities, firms and organisations do. Once they know how they will be assessed, they adapt to the assessment, and sociologists have documented how rankings reshape the institutions they rank.2 In this case the interaction between measure and measured is strategic rather than physical, and this affects everything that follows.
The circle
A further difficulty is well known to philosophers of science. In order to choose the indicators of communion we need to know what communion is; in order to know whether the indicators work we need to be able to measure communion already. This is a version of the problem of coordination, which physics also had to face.3
Hasok Chang has shown how this circle was broken in the case of temperature.4 Initially, temperature was a vague, graded concept tied to sensation. A reliable thermometer required fixed points, but water boils at a fixed temperature only under carefully controlled conditions; checking a thermometer required knowing the temperature already, which was precisely what the thermometer was meant to measure. The way out was what Chang calls epistemic iteration, i.e. a process in which concepts and instruments were refined together over generations, by comparing instruments built on different principles and correcting each against the others.
The mapping of faith-based development is at a stage comparable to early thermometry, which is the normal beginning of measurement. Iteration, however, works only if something stands outside the circle and can correct it. In the case of temperature, this role was played by the comparison between instruments resting on different physical principles. In our case, it can only be played by sources of evidence that do not depend on the indicators themselves, such as cases followed over many years, independent verification and the judgement of those who live the experience being measured.
The risk of washing
The two disanalogies together point to a risk that finance knows under the name of greenwashing. The term is modelled on whitewashing, i.e. covering a wall with a coat of lime to hide its condition, and it now has a fairly precise meaning. The European financial supervisors describe it as a practice in which sustainability-related statements, declarations or communications do not clearly and fairly reflect the actual sustainability profile of a firm or a financial product.5 In short, greenwashing is a gap between how sustainable something appears and how sustainable it is.
The gap arises in a specific way. Environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings were introduced, among other things, to tell investors how sustainable a firm is. A rating, however, observes little of the firm’s actual impact on the environment and much of what the firm declares about itself, such as its policies, its targets and its reports. An OECD study of more than 2,000 metrics used by eight major rating products found that about two thirds of them capture policies and activities reported by the firms themselves, and less than a third actual outcomes such as emissions or accidents.6 These declarations are the affections of sustainability, in Galileo’s sense, and a firm can produce them without being very sustainable. Indeed, firms tend to report what puts them in a good light,7 and different agencies often give very different ratings to the same firm.8 Greenwashing, moreover, need not be fraud. More often an organisation gradually learns to produce what is counted instead of what the counting was meant to track, which is what Goodhart’s law describes: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.9
The analogy with faith-based development can now be made explicit. Washing becomes possible when what is measured is only a sign of what we care about, when those who are measured have an interest in the result, and when producing the sign costs less than producing the substance. In our case, the first condition holds because no law connects the observable effects to the relational good, and the second because recognition and funding increasingly depend on the indicators. The third holds wherever reports and impact figures are easier to produce than trust and communion.
The separability of effects from essence, which in physics is a virtue, is precisely what makes counterfeiting possible when the measured have an interest in the result. By analogy, I call faith-washing the gap between the relational good that a faith-based contribution appears to have, judged by its measurable affections, and the relational good it actually has. As in the case of greenwashing, this gap need not be deliberate: it is a structural possibility, which follows from the same choice that makes measurement possible. In finance, greenwashing was exposed by evidence that the firms had not produced themselves, and in our case, too, the indicators need to be corrected by something that does not depend on them.
A condition, and a task
The conclusion I draw from this is a condition on measurement. Galileo’s choice to measure affections rather than essences is legitimate in this field too, provided that the link between affections and essence is built and tested instead of assumed. In physics, this link is provided by a theory. Here it has to be provided by a body of work, which includes the conceptual analysis of relational and religious goods, the comparison between independent sources of evidence, the long-term study of cases and a clear account of what each indicator can and cannot show.
This is academic work of a kind that no single discipline can carry out alone. In particular, it requires the collaboration of philosophers of measurement, social scientists, economists and theologians, together with the practitioners whose experience is being measured. The Bridging Worlds conference has opened the question, and answering it will take years of work.
Cover: a detail of Justus Sustermans’ portrait of Galileo Galilei (1636), with a financial chart.
Footnotes
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G. Galilei, third letter to Mark Welser on sunspots, 1 December 1612, in Istoria e dimostrazioni intorno alle macchie solari, Rome, 1613: “o noi vogliamo specolando tentar di penetrar l’essenza vera ed intrinseca delle sustanze naturali; o noi vogliamo contentarci di venir in notizia d’alcune loro affezioni”. The translation is mine. ↩
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W. N. Espeland and M. Sauder, “Rankings and reactivity: how public measures recreate social worlds”, American Journal of Sociology 113 (2007), 1–40. ↩
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B. C. van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008. For an overview see E. Tal, “Measurement in Science”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ↩
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H. Chang, Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress, Oxford University Press, 2004. ↩
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ESMA, EBA and EIOPA, Progress Reports on Greenwashing, 31 May 2023. On the regulatory side, see also Directive (EU) 2024/825, which restricts generic environmental claims, and Regulation (EU) 2024/3005 on the transparency and integrity of ESG rating activities. ↩
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OECD, Behind ESG Ratings: Unpacking Sustainability Metrics, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/3f055f0c-en. ↩
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T. P. Lyon and J. W. Maxwell, “Greenwash: corporate environmental disclosure under threat of audit”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 20 (2011), 3–41. ↩
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F. Berg, J. F. Kölbel and R. Rigobon, “Aggregate confusion: the divergence of ESG ratings”, Review of Finance 26 (2022), 1315–1344. ↩
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The formulation is due to M. Strathern, “‘Improving ratings’: audit in the British University system”, European Review 5 (1997), 305–321, who generalised an observation of the economist Charles Goodhart on monetary targets. ↩