No View from Nowhere

Relations, polarization, and fraternity. A summary of my talk at the VIII International Seminar of the RUEF in Santiago de Chile, on what the relational picture of quantum theory can suggest about polarization and fraternity.

A few weeks ago I was asked to contribute to the VIII International Seminar of the Red Universitaria para el Estudio de la Fraternidad (RUEF), held in Santiago at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile on the theme “Los desafíos de la fraternidad en tiempos de polarización”. Fraternity is not my field. I work on the foundations of physics, and those who study fraternity as a political and social category do so with tools I do not have. What I could offer was something more limited: to take a structure I know well, the relational picture of reality that comes from quantum theory, and to see whether it could help, even a little, to think about this question. What follows is a summary of that attempt; the full text and the slides are linked at the end.

The attempt rests on an analogy, and I want to be clear about its status. I do not think that society has the structure of quantum theory, and nothing about social life can be deduced from physics.1 The idea is rather to use a precisely defined structure as a lens, and to see whether, looking through it, some distinctions become sharper, or some phenomena that are usually studied separately appear related. If the lens does not help, it can simply be put aside.

From relational quantum mechanics, in the version proposed by Carlo Rovelli, I took four ideas.2 The first is that the properties of a physical system exist only in relation to another system: an electron has no position in itself, but only a position relative to what it interacts with. It follows that an object has many properties, relative to the many systems with which it interacts,3 and that these properties can be a matter of degree, since the theory allows outcomes that are sometimes neither a sharp yes nor a sharp no. The second idea is that no observer sees everything from above. Every description of the world is given from within some relation, and this follows from the first idea rather than from the limits of our instruments: there is no system relative to which all properties are given at once. The third idea limits the second, since partiality is not relativism. The theory keeps track of how the relations constrain one another, so that the accounts of different observers can be compared, and this record makes perspectives comparable without being itself a perspective.4 The fourth idea is that an object is not “only” the sum of its relations, since some of its properties, such as the total spin of the electron, belong to it whatever it interacts with.

Each of these ideas seemed to me to suggest a requirement on what fraternity would have to be, and each requirement to correspond to a way in which polarization goes wrong. Polarization may be read, first, as a forced measurement. Each of us belongs to many groups, and to each of them only to some degree; polarization isolates one of these belongings and demands a yes or a no, so that a person ends up entirely inside or outside, which political scientists describe as the alignment of identities.5 Second, it may be read as a partial perspective that takes itself to be the view from nowhere.6 Disagreement, which is the normal condition of social life, then turns into enmity, since whoever sees differently can no longer appear as someone who sees from elsewhere, and only as someone who refuses to see. Third, polarization may act on what we hold in common, that is, on the institutions, the language and the shared facts that make our points of view comparable. It may deny them, as in echo chambers, where each group ends up with its own facts, or it may appropriate them, as in the populist claim to speak for the “real people”.7 Finally, at the extreme, it reduces the person to their position, so that the recognition of the other comes to depend on which side they are on.

So far, however, these requirements tell us more about polarization than about fraternity. They ask that a fraternal relation rest on something we have in common, but they do not say what this is, and this is where the question became more interesting for me. If what we share is only a set of rules, we have tolerance, with a thin bond. If it is an identity, the bond is strong, but plurality is lost, and we become brothers by becoming alike. Following Antonio Maria Baggio, I suggested that fraternity might lie in a third possibility: what we have in common is our common humanity, which is not a belonging and which no group can claim as its own.8 Such a fraternity would not merely tolerate the plurality of belongings, since it would need it. Two features seemed to follow, and both have an echo in the physics. The bond is among equals who remain different, as in relational quantum mechanics there is no privileged observer. And, like the total spin of the electron, our common humanity does not come in degrees, while our concrete relations can be more or less fraternal.

If this picture holds, polarization and fraternity could be read as two ways of living the same relational structure, the first collapsing it and the second keeping it open. I am aware that this is a first sketch, written by someone who comes from elsewhere, and that much of what matters is missing, in particular the history of political fraternity, its asymmetries, and the cases in which it excluded more than it included. I would like to work on it further, with colleagues who know these questions far better than I do.

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Cover: based on the graphic design of the VIII Seminario Internacional de la RUEF, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

References

  • Adlam, E., and Rovelli, C. (2023). “Information is Physical: Cross-Perspective Links in Relational Quantum Mechanics”. Philosophy of Physics 1(1).
  • Baggio, A. M. (ed.) (2007). Il principio dimenticato. La fraternità nella riflessione politologica contemporanea. Rome: Città Nuova.
  • Baggio, A. M. (2013). “The Forgotten Principle: Fraternity in Its Public Dimension”. Claritas: Journal of Dialogue and Culture 2(2): 35–52.
  • Mason, L. (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Müller, J.-W. (2016). What Is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
  • Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Pienaar, J. (2021). “A Quintet of Quandaries: Five No-Go Theorems for Relational Quantum Mechanics”. Foundations of Physics 51: 97.
  • Rovelli, C. (1996). “Relational Quantum Mechanics”. International Journal of Theoretical Physics 35(8): 1637–1678.
  • Rovelli, C. (2025). “Relational Quantum Mechanics”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published 2002; substantive revision 2025).
  • Wendt, A. (2015). Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Footnotes

  1. In this I distance myself from approaches that take social life to be quantum in a literal sense, such as Wendt (2015). Here only a conceptual structure is borrowed, and only as a heuristic. ↩

  2. Rovelli (1996). The interpretation is the subject of a lively debate, and not everyone would accept the four ideas in the form I give them here; see Rovelli (2025) for an overview and Pienaar (2021) for some objections. A careful discussion would require more than a note, and it is not needed for the use I make of these ideas here. ↩

  3. This is a simplification. An object has distinct degrees of freedom, such as position and spin, and so distinct properties relative to the same system. Moreover, relative properties are not simply accumulated: a new interaction can replace an earlier one, as when the spin of an electron is measured again along a different direction, and the value obtained before is no longer a property of the system. I leave these details aside here. ↩

  4. This should not be read as the postulate of cross-perspective links proposed by Adlam and Rovelli (2023), which is the subject of a debate of its own. What I have in mind is more modest: the total quantum state can be read as a bookkeeping device for the relations among subsystems. ↩

  5. Mason (2018). ↩

  6. The expression is Nagel’s (1986), although I use it here in a different sense. ↩

  7. On the populist claim to an exclusive representation of the people, see Müller (2016). ↩

  8. Baggio (2007; 2013). ↩